


**“As our Island of Knowledge Grows,  
So Does the Shore of our Ignorance”**

**Yakov Ben-Haim**

**Technion**

**Israel Institute of Technology**



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# 1 *Highlights*

## *Highlights*

### § Questions:

Are experiments irrelevant? Could they become so?

Why?

§

## *Highlights*

### § Question:

Are experiments irrelevant? Could they become so?  
Why?

### § 3 claims:

- We cannot know the extent of our ignorance.
- Simulation useful in exploring the known or possible.  
Less useful in exploring the unknown or ‘impossible’.
- Info-gap theory for exploring the ‘impossible’.

## **2** *First Claim*

§ We cannot know the extent of our ignorance.

We cannot know *today*, what will be invented *tomorrow*.

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§ Can we *bet* about the unknown?

- John Maynard Keynes:

Part of our knowledge we obtain direct; and part by argument. The **Theory of Probability** is concerned with that part which we obtain by argument, and it treats of the different degrees in which the results so obtained are conclusive or inconclusive.

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- Rudolf Carnap: “all inductive reasoning ... is reasoning in terms of **probability**.”

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- Rudolf Carnap: “all inductive reasoning ... is reasoning in terms of **probability**.”

§ **Probability useful, within limits of knowledge.**

§ **Short explanation:** Probability needs an event space:

- Specification of contingencies.
- Explicit, logically coherent.
- Cannot contain the unimaginable.

§

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- Specification of contingencies.
- Explicit, logically coherent.
- Cannot contain the unimaginable.

## § **Longer explanations:**

- Shackle-Popper Indeterminism.
- Knightian uncertainty and info-gaps.

### **3** *Principle of Indifference*

§ **Question:** Is ignorance probabilistic?

§

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§ **Principle of indifference** (Bayes, LaPlace, Jaynes, ...):

- Elementary events,  
about which **nothing is known**,  
are assigned **equal probabilities**.

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§ **Principle of indifference** (Bayes, Laplace, Jaynes, ...):

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- Uniform distribution represents **complete ignorance**.

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§ **Question:** Is ignorance probabilistic?

§ **Principle of indifference** (Bayes, LaPlace, Jaynes, ...):

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about which **nothing is known**,  
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- Uniform distribution represents **complete ignorance**.

§ The **info-gap contention**:

The probabilistic domain of discourse  
does not encompass all epistemic uncertainty.

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§ **Question:** Is ignorance probabilistic?

§ **Principle of indifference** (Bayes, LaPlace, Jaynes, ...):

- Elementary events,  
about which **nothing is known**,  
are assigned **equal probabilities**.
- Uniform distribution represents **complete ignorance**.

§ **The info-gap contention:**

The probabilistic domain of discourse  
does not encompass all epistemic uncertainty.

§ **We will consider common misuses of probability.**

### 3.1 *Keynes' Example*

§  $\rho =$  specific gravity [g/cm<sup>3</sup>] is **unknown:**

$$1 \leq \rho \leq 3$$


§

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
§ **Principle of indifference**:

Uniform distribution in  $[1, 3]$ , so:



§ Uniform distribution in  $[1, 3]$ , so:

$$\mathbf{Prob} \left( \frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3 \right) = \frac{3}{4}$$



§  $\phi =$  specific volume [ $\text{cm}^3/\text{g}$ ] is **unknown**:

$$\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq 1$$


§

§  $\phi =$  specific volume [ $\text{cm}^3/\text{g}$ ] is **unknown**:

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§ **Principle of indifference**:

Uniform distribution in  $[\frac{1}{3}, 1]$ , so:






## § Principle of indifference:

Uniform distribution in  $[\frac{1}{3}, 1]$ , so:

$$\mathbf{Prob} \left( \frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3} \right) = \frac{1}{2}$$



§ These two events are identical:

$$\underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} \equiv \underbrace{\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (1)$$

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§ Hence their probabilities are equal:

$$\underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (3)$$

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§ Hence:

$$\frac{1}{2} = \frac{3}{4}$$

$$\frac{1}{2} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} = \frac{3}{4}$$

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§ Hence their probabilities are equal:

$$\underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} \quad (7)$$

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$$\frac{1}{2} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{1}{3} \leq \phi \leq \frac{2}{3}\right)}_{\text{Specific volume}} = \underbrace{\mathbf{Prob}\left(\frac{3}{2} \leq \rho \leq 3\right)}_{\text{Specific gravity}} = \frac{3}{4}$$

§ **The Culprit:** Principle of indifference.

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§ **The Culprit:** Principle of indifference.

§ Ignorance is **not probabilistic**. It's an **info-gap**.

## 3.2 2-Envelope Riddle

### § The riddle:

- You are presented with two envelopes.
  - Each contains a positive sum of money.
  - One contains twice the contents of the other.
- You **choose an envelope**, open it, and find \$ 50.
- **Would you like to switch envelopes?**

§ **You reason** as follows:

- Other envelope contains either \$ 25 or \$ 100.
- **Principle of indifference:**
- Assume equal probabilities.

The expected value upon switching is:

$$\text{E.V.} = \frac{1}{2} \$ 25 + \frac{1}{2} \$ 100 = \$ 62.50.$$

$$\$ 62.50 > \$ 50.$$

- Yes! **Let's switch**, you say.



## § The riddle, re-visited:

- You are presented with two envelopes.
  - Each contains a positive sum of money.
  - One contains twice the contents of the other.
- You **choose an envelope**, but do not open it.
- **Would you like to switch envelopes?**

§ You reason as follows:

- This envelope contains  $\$ X > \$ 0$ .
- Other envelope contains either  $\$ 2X$  or  $\$ \frac{1}{2}X$ .
- **Principle of indifference:**
- Assume equal probabilities.

The expected value upon switching is:

$$\text{E.V.} = \frac{1}{2} \$ 2X + \frac{1}{2} \$ \frac{1}{2}X = \$ \left(1 + \frac{1}{4}\right)X > X.$$

- Yes! **Let's switch**, you say.

§ You reason as follows:

- This envelope contains  $\$ X > \$ 0$ .
- Other envelope contains either  $\$ 2X$  or  $\$ \frac{1}{2}X$ .
- **Principle of indifference:**
- Assume equal probabilities.

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$$\text{E.V.} = \frac{1}{2} \$ 2X + \frac{1}{2} \$ \frac{1}{2}X = \$ \left(1 + \frac{1}{4}\right)X > X.$$

- Yes! **Let's switch**, you say.

§ You wanna switch again? **And again? And again?**

§ We cannot know the extent of our ignorance,  
And probability can't fill all the gaps.



§ We cannot know the extent of our ignorance,

And probability can't fill all the gaps.

- Info-gap decision theory can help.
- Empiricism is essential.

## 4 *Second Claim*

§ **Simulation useful** in exploring the **known or possible**.  
**Less useful** in exploring the **unknown or ‘impossible’**.

## § Computer simulation:

- **Predicts** and explores **implications** of knowledge.
-

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- Predicts and explores implications of knowledge.
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- Simulation cannot predict implications of unknown laws or physical properties.
- E.g. Simulation in 1900 could not predict or explain black body radiation.
- E.g. Simulation today cannot predict implications of tomorrow's discovery.
- Science vs. science fiction.  
Induction vs. imagination. (Both important!)

## 5 *Third Claim*

- **Info-gap models of uncertainty** for exploring the ‘impossible’.
- **Examples of info-gaps.**

## Lewis Carroll's

*~~ Transcendental Probability ~~*

Figure 1: Dodgson, 1832–1898.



Figure 2: Alice

“A bag contains **2 counters**, as to which nothing is known except that each is **either black or white**. Ascertain their colours without taking them out of the bag.”

## Lewis Carroll's

*~~Transcendental Probability~~*

Figure 3: Dodgson, 1832–1898.



Figure 4: Alice

“A bag contains **2 counters**, as to which nothing is known except that each is **either black or white**. Ascertain their colours without taking them out of the bag.”

**Answer:** “One is black, and the other white.”



*~~Pascal's Wager~~*

Figure 5: Blaise Pascal, 1623-1662.

The wager is described in *Pensées* as:

“‘God is, or He is not.’ Reason can decide nothing here. ... Heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager? ...

“If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is. ... Since there is an equal risk of gain and of loss, ...”

*~~Thames Flood Barrier~~*

Figure 6: 1953 barrier breach.      Figure 7: Barrier element.

**§ Some facts:**

- 1953: worst storm surge of century.
- Flood defences breached.
- 307 dead. Thousands evacuated.
- Canvey Island in Estuary devastated.
- Current barrier opened May 1984.

## § Thames 2100:

Major re-design of flood defences.

## § Uncertainties:

- **Statistics** of surge height:
  - Fairly complete: most years since 1819.
  - Planning for 1000-year surge.
- **Global warming:** sea level rise.
- **Tectonic settling** of s. England.
- **Damage vs flood depth.**
- **Human action:** dredging, embanking.
- **Urban development.**

## § Severe Knightian uncertainties: Gaps in knowledge, understanding and goals.

*~~Fukushima Nuclear Reactor~~*

Figure 8: Sea wall breach.



Figure 9: Hydrogen explosion.

**§ Some facts:**

- 11.3.2011: Richter-9 earthquake in NE Japan.
- Tsunami followed shortly.
- Sea wall breached: fig. 8.<sup>‡</sup>
- Hydrogen explosion several days later. Fig. 9.<sup>‡</sup>
- Slow disaster recovery.

**§ Info-gaps:**

- Sub-system interactions.
- Institutional constraints.

~~Interest rate after 9/11~~




Figure 10: ECB Interest Rates

- Rate fairly constant through Aug 2001

-

~~Interest rate after 9/11~~




Figure 11: ECB Interest Rates

Figure 12: 11 Sept 2001.

- Rate fairly constant through Aug 2001
- After 9/11 ECB will reduce the rate.
- Info-gap:
  - Reduce by how much?
  - What is ECB decision model?

~~Phillips Curve~~




Figure 13: Inflation vs. unemployment in the US, 1961–1967.

- Linear? Quadratic?




Figure 14: Inflation vs. unemployment in the US, 1961–1967.




Figure 15: Inflation vs. unemployment in the US, 1961–1993.

- Linear? Quadratic?
- Info-gaps:
  - Uncertain data and process.
  - **Unknown functional relation.**



*~~ Climate Change ~~*§ **The issue:**

Sustained rise in **green house gases**

results in **temperature rise**

which results in **adverse economic impact.**

§ **Models:**

- Temperature change:  $\Delta\text{CO}_2 \implies \Delta T$ .
- Economic impact:  $\Delta T \implies \Delta\text{GDP}$ .

§ **The problems:**

- **Models** highly uncertain.
- **Data** controversial.

§ E.g., IPCC model for

## Uncertainty in Equil'm Clim. Sensi'ty, $S$ .

- Likely range:  $1.5^{\circ}\text{C}$  to  $4.5^{\circ}\text{C}$ .
- Extreme values highly uncertain.
- 95th quantile of  $S$  in 10 studies:  
Mean:  $7.1^{\circ}\text{C}$ . St. Dev:  $2.8^{\circ}\text{C}$ .




Figure 16: IPCC ch.10, p.799.

*~~Profiling Criminals~~*

Figure 17: Profiling raises arrests.

- **Profiling: focus policing resources.**
  - **Arrests rise** in profiled group.
  - **Crime rises** in other groups.
  - Everybody happy?
- **Info-gaps: Uncertain response functions.**

## 2 *Info-Gap Models of Uncertainty*

### § What are info-gaps?

- **Models** are used to make **decisions**.
- **Info-gap:**  
Disparity between what **is known**  
and what **needs to be known**  
in order to make a **good decision**.
- **Info-gap:**
  - Non-probabilistic (Knightian) uncertainty.
  - Indeterminism, ignorance, surprise.

## § Examples:

- **Contaminated field:**

$f(x)$  = uncertain spatial distribution.

- **Parasite infestation:**

$f(x)$  = uncertain spatial distribution.

$P(n)$  = uncertain prob. of  $n$  infestations.

- **Seismic load:**

$f(x, t)$  = uncertain space/time variation.

- **Strategic game:**

$\pi$  = antagonist's uncertain preferences.

- **Financial loss:**

$p(\ell)$  = uncertain probability of loss  $\ell$ .

- **Financial gain:**

$\mu, \Sigma$  = uncertain mean, covariance of returns.

- **Medical treatment:**

$u(x)$  = uncertain dis-utility of side effect.


- **Mechanical friction:**

$f(x, \dot{x})$  = uncertain force.

- **Inflation-unemployment trade-off:**

$u(x)$  = uncertain Phillips curve.

## Spatial distribution of contaminate.



### § Mass-density functions:

- $\tilde{f}(x)$  = best estimate of distribution.
- $f(x)$  = unknown true distribution.

§ **Info-gap:** disparity between  $f(x)$  and  $\tilde{f}(x)$ .

§ **How to model the info-gap?**

## § Fractional-error info-gap model.

$$\mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{f}) = \{f(x) : |f(x) - \tilde{f}(x)| \leq h\tilde{f}(x)\}, \quad h \geq 0 \quad (1)$$

## § Two levels of uncertainty:

$f(x)$  = unknown true realization.

$h$  = unknown horizon of uncertainty.

§



## § Fractional-error info-gap model.

$$\mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{f}) = \{f(x) : |f(x) - \tilde{f}(x)| \leq h\tilde{f}(x)\}, \quad h \geq 0 \quad (2)$$

## § Two levels of uncertainty:

$f(x)$  = unknown true realization.

$h$  = unknown horizon of uncertainty.

## § Axioms of info-gap uncertainty:

- $\mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{f})$  is a **set-valued function**.
- **Contraction:**  $\mathcal{U}(0, \tilde{f}) = \{\tilde{f}\}$ .
- **Nesting:**  $h < h^\bullet \implies \mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{f}) \subseteq \mathcal{U}(h^\bullet, \tilde{f})$

## § Fourier-ellipsoid info-gap model.

$$f(x) = \tilde{f}(x) + \sum_{i=1}^N c_i \cos \frac{i\pi x}{L} \quad (3)$$

$$\mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{f}) = \{f(x) : c^T W c \leq h^2\}, \quad h \geq 0 \quad (4)$$

## § Two levels of uncertainty:

$f(x)$  = unknown true realization.

$h$  = unknown horizon of uncertainty.

## Parasite infestations

§  $P(n)$  = probability of  $n$  attacks/season.

- Random, not independent.
- Poisson-like uncertain distribution  $P(n)$ .
- $\mathcal{P}(h, \tilde{p})$  = info-gap model: **uncertain**  $P(n)$ .

§  $u(x)$  = intensity of attack at location  $x$ .

- Some areas more prone, some less.
- Some areas more variable, some less.
- $\mathcal{U}(h, \tilde{u})$  = info-gap model: **uncertain**  $u(x)$ .

~~*Summary*~~

§ **Deep Knightian uncertainties:** Gaps in knowledge, understanding and goals.

§

~~*Summary*~~

§ **Deep Knightian uncertainties:** Gaps in knowledge, understanding and goals.

§ **Info-Gap models of uncertainty:**

- Disparity between what **is known** and what **needs to be known** for responsible decision.

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~~*Summary*~~

- § **Deep Knightian uncertainties:** Gaps in knowledge, understanding and goals.
- § **Info-Gap models of uncertainty:**
- Disparity between what **is known** and what **needs to be known** for responsible decision.
  - **Unbounded family of sets** of events (points, functions or sets).
  - **No known worst case.**
  - No functions of probability, plausibility, likelihood, etc.
  - Hybrid: info-gap model of probabilities.

### **3** *Conclusion*

## In Conclusion

§ Info-gap uncertainty:

innovation, discovery, ignorance, surprise.

§



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§ Info-gap uncertainty:

innovation, discovery, ignorance, surprise.

§ Info-gap uncertainty is unbounded, non-probabilistic.

§

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§ Optimism: our knowledge gets better all the time.

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## In Conclusion

§ **Info-gap uncertainty:**

innovation, discovery, ignorance, surprise.

§ **Info-gap uncertainty is unbounded, non-probabilistic.**

§ **Optimism:** our knowledge gets better all the time.

§ **Realism:** our knowledge is wrong now  
(and we don't know where or how much).

§

## In Conclusion

### § Info-gap uncertainty:

innovation, discovery, ignorance, surprise.

### § Info-gap uncertainty is unbounded, non-probabilistic.

### § Optimism: our knowledge gets better all the time.

### § Realism: our knowledge is wrong now (and we don't know where or how much).

### § Responsible decision making:

- Specify your goals.
- Maximize your robustness to uncertainty.
- Study the trade offs.
- Exploit windfall opportunities.